














































The	 EUPACK	 project	 has	 generated	 comprehensive	 country	 knowledge	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	
public	administration	in	EU	member	states.	It	covers	a	wide	range	of	themes	in	public	administration	
including	the	size,	structure	and	scope	of	government,	the	management	of	the	civil	service,	policy-






include	 (i)	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 EU	 support	 provided	 so	 far	 in	 the	 area	 of	
administrative	 capacity	 building,	 (ii)	 the	 factors	 that	 drive	 differences	 in	 the	 quality	 of	 public	
administration	 across	 EU	 member	 states,	 and	 (iii)	 the	 identification	 of	 institutional	 designs	 and	





civil	 service	 reform	 and	 management	 as	 one	 of,	 if	 not,	 the	 most	 important	 dimension	 of	 public	
administration.	 In	this	context	civil	service	management	 is	understood	as	the	day-to-day	operation	
of	managing	people	in	public	administration.	It	includes	management	functions	such	as	recruitment,	
promotion,	 transfer,	 dismissals,	 salary	 management,	 performance	 evaluation	 and	 will	 further	
address	questions	such	as	the	adequate	scope	of	the	civil	service	(Berman	2015).		
	
The	 briefing	 note	 will	 raise	 more	 questions	 than	 provide	 answers.	 This	 reflects	 our	 limited	
understanding	of	 ‘what	works’	 in	the	area	of	civil	service	reform	and	management	(Meyer-Sahling,	
Mikkelsen	 and	 Schuster	 2018).	 This	 may	 be	 surprising,	 as	 there	 is	 a	 general	 consensus	 among	
researchers	 and	 practitioners	 that	 the	 professionalisation	 of	 the	 civil	 service	 is	 essential	 for	 a	
country’s	development	(Evans	and	Rauch	1999).	However,	we	lack	adequate	evidence	how	to	design	




we	 centralise	 civil	 service	 recruitment	 or	 should	 we	 delegate	 it	 to	 individual	 administrative	
organisations?	 Shall	 we	 reward	 civil	 servants	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 performance	 or	 shall	 salaries	
mainly	 be	 determined	 by	 years	 of	 experience	 or	 other	 mechanisms?	 How	 does	 an	 effective	
performance	evaluation	in	the	civil	service	look	like?		
	
These	 are	 critical	 questions	 for	 civil	 service	 reformers.	 Questions	 of	 this	 kind	 often	 appear	 for	
reformers	at	the	level	of	EU	member	states	and	are	indeed	regularly	posed	to	European	Commission	





of	 public	 administration	 in	 Europe.	 First,	 there	 is	 a	 broad	 consensus	 that	 merit	 recruitment	 has	
positive	 consequences	 for	 the	 performance,	 motivation	 and	 integrity	 of	 civil	 servants,	 while	 the	
politicisation	 of	 the	 civil	 service	 is	 widely	 associated	 with	 negative	 consequences	 (Dahlstroem,	
Lapuente	 and	 Teorell	 2012,	 Evans	 and	Rauch	1999,	Meyer-Sahling	 and	Mikkelsen	2016,	Neshkova	
and	Kostadinova	 2012,	Oliveros	 and	 Schuster	 2017).	 Second,	 civil	 service	 reformers	 and	 academic	
researchers	lack	adequate	evidence	on	how	to	design	effective	merit	recruitment	systems	and	how	
to	 overcome	 problems	 of	 civil	 service	 politicisation	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Third,	 there	 exists	 limited	
knowledge	on	what	works	in	other	areas	as	of	civil	service	management	such	as	salary	management,	




what	 to	 advice	 and	 how	 to	 support	 EU	member	 states	 in	 their	 quest	 for	 a	 better	working	 public	
administration.	 In	 particular,	 it	 provides	 an	 invitation	 to	 generate	 systematic	 evidence	 on	 how	 to	
improve	the	quality	of	public	administration	 in	Europe	and	to	support	measures	 in	member	states	
that	seek	to	generate	better	evidence	on	what	works	 in	civil	service	management,	 for	 instance,	by	
means	 of	 regular	 civil	 service	 surveys	 that	 are	 used	 in	 several	 OECD	 countries.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	






The	 briefing	 note	 is	 based	 on	 insights	 from	 the	 academic	 literature	 on	 public	 administration,	 in	
particular,	civil	service	reform	and	management	and	research	conducted	by	the	authors	on	the	issue	
in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	and	the	Western	Balkans	in	the	context	of	projects	funded	by	SIGMA-
OECD	 and	 the	 Regional	 School	 of	 Public	 Administration	 (ReSPA)	 (Meyer-Sahling	 2009	 and	 2012,	
Meyer-Sahling	et	al	2015).	In	addition,	the	note	will,	where	possible,	refer	to	evidence	from	a	project	






Political	 scientists,	 economists,	 public	 administration	 and	management	 scholars	widely	 agree	 that	
the	 quality	 of	 a	 country’s	 bureaucracy,	 in	 particular,	 the	 professionalization	 of	 its	 civil	 service,	 is	
beneficial	 for	 its	 development.	 A	 ‘use-able’	 bureaucracy	 is	 a	 precondition	 for	 the	 consolidation	 of	
democracy	(Linz	and	Stepan	1996).	 It	 is	associated	with	economic	growth	and	development	(Evans	
and	 Rauch	 1999).	 It	 is	 associated	 with	 less	 public	 sector	 corruption	 (Dahlstroem,	 Lapuente	 and	
Teorell	 2012,	 Meyer-Sahling	 and	 Mikkelsen	 2016,	 Oliveros	 and	 Schuster	 2017).	 It	 enhances	 the	
performance	 of	 public	 policy,	 in	 particular,	 by	 improving	 the	management	 of	 policy	 programmes	
(Lewis	 2008).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 European	 integration,	 bureaucratic	 quality	 is	 positively	 associated	





performance	 and	 integrity	 of	 the	 civil	 service.	 On	 the	 other,	 it	 has	 been	 widely	 shown	 that	 civil	














particular	 ethnic	 or	 social	 groups	 (Meyer-Sahling	 et	 al	 2015).	 In	 short,	 it	 assumes	 that	 the	 best-
qualified	person	is	selected	for	a	given	role.		Accordingly,	merit	recruitment	is	argued	to	increase	the	




While	 the	 benefits	 of	 merit	 recruitment	 are	 very	 plausible,	 it	 is	 less	 clear	 how	 to	 best	 organise	
recruitment	 processes	 to	 achieve	merit	 outcomes.	 Several	 design	 options	must	 be	 considered	 by	













First,	 written	 examinations	 are	 commonly	 assumed	 to	 help	 to	 screen	 the	 competencies	 of	
candidates	(Heywood	and	Meyer-Sahling	2013).	Moreover,	they	might	increase	the	transparency	of	
recruitment	 and	 selection	 and	 attract	 a	 wider	 pool	 of	 potential	 applicants,	 as	 they	 signal	 to	 the	
outside	world	 that	 recruitment	 and	 selection	 processes	 are	 professionally	managed.	 At	 the	 same	











To	 give	 a	 couple	 of	 examples	 from	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 Estonia	 and	 Latvia	 are	 the	 two	






Second,	 the	 degree	 of	 central	 involvement	 in	 recruitment	 and	 selection	 processes	 is	 even	 more	
contested.	 Centralisation,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 tends	 to	 increase	 the	 consistency	 of	 recruitment	 and	




For	 now,	 there	 is	 little	 robust	 evidence	 on	 the	 pros	 and	 cons	 of	 centralisation	 versus	 delegation.	
Most	 plausibly,	 it	 depends	 again	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 context.	 Decentralisation	 may	 be	
suitable	in	a	context	of	low	politicisation	where	managers	maybe	relied	upon	using	their	discretion	
responsibly	 to	 select	 the	best-qualified	 candidate.	 The	 same	may	not	be	 true	 in	 a	 context	of	 high	
politicisation,	 in	which	managers	are	 subject	 to	political	pressures	or	 they	are	 themselves	political	
appointees.	Indeed,	emerging	evidence	from	the	Western	Balkans	suggests	that	a	prominent	role	for	
line	mangers	is	associated	with	more	politicisation	and	more	favouritism,	presumably	because	of	the	





However,	 even	 if	 recruitment	 processes	 have	 been	 centralised	 and	 if	 compulsory	 written	
examinations	have	been	introduced,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	they	will	succeed	in	bringing	about	
the	 desired	 merit	 outcomes	 (Schuster	 2017).	 The	 evidence	 from	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 and,	 in	






and	political	 appointees	usually	 seek	ways	 to	 circumvent	 the	 formal	 rules	 of	 the	 game.	 They	may	
influence	the	appointment	of	selection	commissions,	 instruct	 ‘independent’	external	candidates	or	
leak	 examination	 questions,	 all	 of	 which	 undermine	 the	 principle	 of	 merit	 recruitment.	 In	 other	
words,	 even	 if	 we	 identify	 a	 suitable	 design	 of	 a	 recruitment	 and	 selection	 process	 for	 a	 given	





In	 addition	 to	 the	 merits	 of	 merit	 recruitment,	 research	 and	 practice	 have	 paid	 considerable	
attention	to	the	negative	consequences	of	the	politicisation	of	the	civil	service.	Politicisation	refers	
to	the	recruitment,	promotion,	retention,	remuneration	and	disciplining	of	civil	servants	on	the	basis	
of	 political	 principles	 (Peters	 and	 Pierre	 2004).	 Studies	 of	 politicisation	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	







outcomes	 such	 as	 policy	 performance,	 corruption	 and	 the	 absorption	 capacity	 of	 EU	 funds	 (Lewis	
2008,	 Meyer-Sahling	 and	 Mikkelsen	 2016,	 Oliveros	 and	 Schuster	 2017).	 Why	 is	 politicisation	 a	









Politicisation	also	has	 a	number	of	direct	 and	 indirect	 effects	on	 job	 satisfaction,	work	motivation	
and	 the	 intention	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 civil	 service	 (Lewis	2008).	 For	 instance,	when	 senior	positions	 are	
occupied	 by	 political	 appointees,	 staff	 in	 lower	 ranks	 have	 less	 opportunities	 to	 rise	 to	 the	 top	
because	what	matters	are	political	connections	rather	than	performance.	Staff	may	therefore	invest	
in	 political	 lobbying.	 Or	 they	 may	 simply	 see	 their	 career	 opportunities	 narrowed,	 become	 less	
motivated	 and	 choose	 to	 leave	 the	 civil	 service	 altogether.	 We	 can	 therefore	 observe	 that	





at	 the	 factors	and	mechanisms	 that	 facilitate	 the	politicisation	of	 the	civil	 service	 in	 the	 first	place	
and	indeed	contribute	to	its	persistence.	Four	factors	are	particularly	relevant.		
	
First,	 politicisation	 may	 be	 the	 result	 of	 ‘habit’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 deeply	 entrenched	 in	 the	
administrative	 tradition	 of	 a	 country.	 The	 communist	 legacy	 of	 over-politicisation,	 for	 instance,	




Second,	politicians	and	 indeed	bureaucrats	and	external	observers	might	not	know	better,	 that	 is,	
they	might	 lack	 the	awareness	of	 the	negative	consequences	of	politicisation	 for	 the	performance	
and	integrity	of	public	administration.	This	may	sound	implausible	for	those	who	research	or	advice	
on	public	administration	reform	because	they	frequently	encounter	these	questions	 in	the	context	









of	 politicisation,	 they	might	 actually	 draw	 selective	 benefits	 from	politicising	 the	 civil	 service.	 It	 is	
hence	conceivable	that,	under	certain	conditions,	de-politicisation	is	politically	costly	for	politicians.	
In	 particular,	 two	 types	 of	 considerations	 tend	 to	 make	 political	 appointments	 beneficial	 for	
politicians.		
	
In	 the	 first	 place,	 political	 appointments	 are	 a	means	 to	build	parties	or	 political	 networks	 and	 to	
consolidate	electoral	support.	Parties	and	politicians	therefore	make	appointments	to	reward	their	
supporters	 (Grzymala-Busse	 2007,	 Kopecky	 et	 al	 2016).	 This	 motivation	 behind	 politicisation	 was	









In	 the	 second	 place,	 political	 appointments	 are	 a	 means	 of	 controlling	 the	 civil	 service	 (Bach,	
Hammerschmid	 and	 Loeffler	 2015).	 Politicians	 make	 strategic	 appointments	 to	 control	 policy-
making,	implementation	and	coordination	inside	public	administration.	Political	appointments	allow	
ministers	and	political	parties	to	align	their	policy	preferences	with	those	of	the	civil	service	and	to	





Political	appointments	 for	 the	 sake	of	politically	 controlling	 the	civil	 service	are	widespread	across	
Europe.	 They	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 and	 in	 many	 Western	 European	 civil	
services.	Civil	services	that	have	largely	remained	de-politicised	at	the	very	top	such	as	in	the	UK,	the	
Netherlands	 and	Denmark	 are	 exceptions	 in	 Europe.	 Rather,	 for	Western	 Europe,	 there	 has	 been	
debate	 over	 the	 increase	 of	 this	 form	 of	 politicisation	 during	 the	 last	 two	 or	 three	 decades,	 the	
consequences	of	which	remain	poorly	understood.		
	
Quite	 naturally,	 political	 appointments	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 political	 control	 are	more	 common	 after	 a	
party	change	in	government,	in	particular,	when	parties	in	government	change	from	one	end	of	the	
ideological	 spectrum	 to	 the	 other	 (Meyer-Sahling	 and	 Veen	 2012).	 Especially	 in	 the	 new	member	
states	 from	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 politicisation	 at	 the	 top	 is	 higher	 in	














will	 inevitably	fail.	 If	political	 incentives	contradict	these	proposals,	they	will	either	not	be	adopted	







options	 are	 worth	 further	 investigation.	 For	 instance,	 if	 politicians	 are	 unwilling	 to	 give	 up	
appointment	powers,	civil	service	statutes	might	need	to	be	designed	in	a	way	that	they	force	them	
to	 select	 candidates	 for	managerial	 positions	 from	 inside	 the	 civil	 service	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	
candidates	 have	 sufficient	 experience	 and	 expertise	 to	 perform	 their	 job	 at	 the	 highest	 level.	
Alternatively,	 if	politicians	want	to	keep	the	freedom	to	recruit	from	outside	public	administration,	





Western	Europe	 than	 is	usually	admitted	by	 international	organisations	 that	are	 involved	 in	public	
administration	reform	assistance.	For	now,	there	is	no	evidence	that	would	shed	light	on	differential	
effects	 of	 politicisation	 in	 the	 East	 and	 West	 and	 North	 and	 South	 of	 Europe.	 However,	 the	
experience	from	many	Western	European	countries	raises	the	prospect	that	structured	or	bounded	
politicisation	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 civil	 service	 that	 involves	 high	 levels	 of	 professional	 competencies	









instance,	which	 type	of	 salary	 system	 is	more	 conductive	 to	performance	and	 integrity	 in	 the	 civil	






research	 on	 developing	 countries	 suggests	 that	 salary	 levels	 contribute	 to	 job	 satisfaction	 of	 civil	
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Schuster	 2018).	 This	may	 be	 puzzling	 but	 it	 also	 indicates	 that	 the	 focus	 on	 salary	 levels	may	 be	






service.	However,	 is	 it	plausible	 to	assume	that	 the	mode	of	entering	 the	civil	 service	 still	matters	
five,	ten	or	even	twenty	years	into	the	career	in	the	civil	service?	Should	we	not	rather	expect	that	it	
is	much	more	important	how	a	civil	servant	advanced	to	his	current	job	or	will	advance	to	a	better	





Yet	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 different	 types	 of	 promotion	 and	 transfer	 systems	 on	 the	
professionalisation	of	the	civil	service	is	scarce,	too.	Is	it	more	effective	to	focus	on	predictability	and	
transparency,	 for	 instance,	 by	 means	 of	 seniority-based	 promotions?	 Or	 is	 it	 more	 suitable	 to	
establish	competitive	processes	for	promotions	within	the	civil	service	or	even	public	competitions	




Third,	 performance	 evaluation	 systems	have	made	 their	way	 into	 the	 public	 sector	 across	 Europe	
over	 the	 last	 two	decades	 (Staronova	2017).	Common	wisdom	assumes	 that	 they	are	an	essential	
14	
	
management	 tool	 as	 much	 as	 they	 should	 affect	 the	 salary	 level	 and	 career	 prospects	 of	 civil	
servants.	 In	practice,	performance	evaluation	systems	are	often	criticised	 for	 their	 ineffectiveness.	
They	are	therefore	a	common	civil	service	management	function	for	which	policy-makers	at	the	level	
of	 national	 governments	 seek	 advice	 but	 little	 evidence	 is	 available	 for	 public	 administration	 in	
Europe.		
	
Finally,	 comparisons	of	 civil	 service	 systems	 frequently	 focus	on	broad	 categories	 such	 as	 the	 size	
and	scope	of	the	civil	service.	These	are	important	markers	for	the	identification	of	differences	and	
similarities.	However,	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	say	whether	a	 relatively	 larger	or	narrower	scope	of	 the	




that	 certain	 policies	 apply	 to	 employees	 within	 the	 scope.	 This	 means	 that	 a	 change	 in	 scope	
becomes	a	problem	for	civil	service	management,	if	key	policies	of	the	civil	service	are	changed	too.	
In	 Estonia,	 for	 instance,	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 civil	 service	 law	was	 radically	 shrunk	 in	 2013,	while	 the	
category	of	public	employees	was	expanded.	The	change	matters	 insofar	as	employees	are	subject	
to	different	standards	and	procedures.	For	 instance,	they	enjoy	 less	 job	protection,	do	not	have	to	
attend	ethics	training	and	are	not	subject	to	the	policies	of	the	Civil	Service	Ethics	Council.		
	
Similar	 dilemmas	 can	 be	 found	 for	 other	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 countries.	 In	 Poland,	 for	
example,	the	scope	of	the	civil	service	law	has	been	changed	several	times	insofar	as	the	boundary	
between	 politics	 and	 administration	 is	 concerned	 (Heywood	 and	Meyer-Sahling	 2013).	 During	 the	
first	 PiS-led	 governments	 between	 2005	 and	 2007	 the	 high	 and	 mid-level	 managers	 (Directors	
General,	 Directors	 of	 Departments	 and	 their	 Deputies)	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 civil	 service	 and	
transferred	to	a	wider	state	staffing	pool	 that,	 from	the	outside,	had	features	of	a	separate	senior	
civil	 service	 corps.	 In	 theory	 and	practice,	 however,	 it	meant	 that	 governing	parties	 and	ministers	







suited	 to	 manage	 civil	 servants	 effectively.	 The	 positive	 consequences	 of	 merit	 recruitment	 are	
widely	appreciated	but	a	focus	on	merit	versus	politicised	recruitment	fails	to	take	into	account	the	
importance	of	many	other	civil	 service	management	 functions.	There	 is	hence	quite	an	agenda	for	





What	are	 the	 implications	of	 this	discussion	 for	 the	European	Commission’s	 role	 in	promoting	 the	
quality	of	public	administration	in	Europe?	The	conclusions	from	the	briefing	note	should	be	clear:	
The	evidence	for	the	effectiveness	of	many	civil	service	management	functions	is	often	not	available	
or	 it	 is	 not	 robust.	Moreover,	 the	 evidence	 that	 is	 available	 suggests	 that	 some	practices	may	 be	
generally	beneficial	 for	 the	quality	of	 the	civil	 service	but	 in	many	cases	 the	choice	of	 civil	 service	
designs	may	be	context	dependent.		
	
For	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 lack	 of	 robust	 evidence	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 treaty-based	
competencies	in	the	area	of	public	administration	reform	–	would	make	it	extremely	challenging	to	
develop	a	European	public	administration	reform	policy	that	prescribes	member	states	what	to	do.	




One	 of	 the	 most	 effective	 tools	 to	 enhance	 the	 evidence	 for	 managers	 and	 reformers	 is	 the	





and	 hence	 areas	 of	 civil	 service	management	 that	 are	 in	 need	 of	 improvement.	 They	 can	 further	
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provide	 an	 effective	 management	 tool	 to	 engage	 the	 people	 in	 public	 administration,	 solicit	
feedback	and	respond	to	concerns.		
	
For	 the	 European	 Commission,	 civil	 service	 surveys	 would	 allow	 for	 the	 identification	 of	 shared	
standards	and	engagement	 in	 learning	across	EU	member	states.	Moreover,	member	states	would	
benefit	 greatly	 from	 European	 Commission	 support	 as	 regular	 civil	 service	 surveys	would	 provide	
much-sought-after	evidence	and	establish	an	infrastructure	to	conduct	them	in	the	first	place.	To	be	
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